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May Nonlawyer Parents Litigate
IDEA Cases inFederal Court on
Behalf of Their Children?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 255-258. Q 2007 American Bar Association.

Jay E. Grenig is a professor of law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wis., coauthor of eDiscovery and Digital
Evidence and author of California
Code Forms: Education. He can be
reached at jgrenig@earthlink.net
or (414) 288-5377.

ISSUE
To what extent may a non-lawyer
parent of a child with a disability
proceed pro se in a federal court
action brought pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act?
FACTS
Jeff and Sandee Winkelman of
Parma, Ohio, are the parents of
Jacob Winkelman, a young boy diagnosed with autism. In July 2001,
Jacob attended preschool at the
Achievement Center for Children, a
nonprofit agency that specializes in
helping children with special needs.
The Parma City School District paid
for this program because Jacob did
not respond well to its own program. The Achievement Center
offers a special education intervention program including physical
therapy, occupational therapy,
speech therapy, and music therapy.
In September 2001, Parma school
officials met with the Winkelmans
to discuss an Individualized
Education Program (IEP) for Jacob.

The parties agreed that
Achievement Center was an appropriate placement for the 2001-02
and 2002-03 school years.
In June 2003 the parties met to discuss Jacob's IEP for the 2003-04
school year. The 2003-04 IEP proposed educating Jacob in a special
education classroom at Pleasant
Valley Elementary School. Pleasant
Valley is a public school offering
speech and occupational therapy.
The educators at Pleasant Valley are
trained to educate children with
autism.
The Winkelmans were unhappy
with the proposed 2003-04 IEP.
Specifically, they complained that
the proposed 2003-04 IEP did not
include music therapy, did not contain a sufficient amount of speech
therapy or one-on-one interaction,
and did not contain any specific
plan to address their son's need for
occupational therapy. Moreover,
they preferred placing Jacob at
Monarch School-a private school
(Continued on Page 256)
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specializing only in autism and
emphasizing one-on-one interaction
between students and educators
with limited peer interaction.
Nonetheless, the Winkelmans signed
the proposed 2003-04 IEP. Although
they objected to his placement, they
consented to the initiation services.
In June 2003 the Winkelmans filed
a request for a due process hearing,
alleging that Parma had failed to
provide Jacob with a free appropriate public education (FAPE). On
August 27, 2003, the hearing officer
issued an interim order designating
Achievement Center as Jacob's stayput placement. Despite this, the
Winkelmans unilaterally pulled
Jacob from that program and placed
him at Monarch School. Jacob performed well at Monarch School during the 2003-04 school year.
However, because of the expense of
private education, the Winkelmans
did not enroll Jacob in Monarch
School for the 2004-05 school year.
Presently, Jacob is not enrolled at
any school but does participate in a
1-2 hour per week outreach program at Monarch School.
On February 25, 2004, the hearing
officer issued a 56-page decision
finding that Parma provided Jacob
with a FAPE and, thus, did not violate the mandates of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA). The Winkelmans appealed
to a state level review officer, who
on June 2, 2004, issued a 44-page
opinion affirming the hearing
officer's decision.
The Winkelmans represented
themselves in the district court
proceedings. On March 2, 2005,
they filed a Motion for Judgment
on the Pleadings Based on the
Administrative Record. Two weeks
later, Parma filed a Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings Based on
the Administrative Record.

The Winkelmans argued that the
hearing officer had violated IDEA
procedures by allowing another person to "co-preside" over their due
process hearing. The district court
rejected this argument, stating that
nothing in the record suggested the
hearing officer's research assistant
had co-presided over the proceedings. It also rejected the
Winkelmans' argument that Parma
had predetermined to place Jacob in
its own program before it had developed his 2003-2004 IEP.
Given that Jacob was entering a
completely new school setting and
given the overall consensus that a
one-month reassessment was in
Jacob's best interest, the district
court ruled that the lack of goals
and objectives in the IEP for occupational therapy only constituted a
technical, procedural violation of
the IDEA and was not reversible
error. The court also found that the
reduction of speech therapy from 90
minutes to 60 minutes and the lack
of one-on-one academic instruction
did not constitute a substantive violation of the IDEA. Acknowledging
that Jacob loves and responds well
to music, the court nevertheless
found that the record did not support the notion that Jacob needed
music therapy in order to receive
educational benefits. The district
court granted Parma's motion for
judgment on the pleadings and
ordered each party to bear its own
costs. Winkelman v. Parma City
School District, 411 F. Supp. 2d 722
(N.D. Ohio 2005).
The Winkelmans filed two appeals
pro se representing themselves
without the help of a lawyer. The
first appeal challenged the district
court's denial of a preliminary
injunction regarding Jacob's stayput placement. The Sixth Circuit
ordered dismissal of that appeal
unless petitioners retained counsel
within 30 days. The court relied on
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Cavanaugh v. CardinalLocal
School Dist., 409 F.3d 753 (6th Cir.
2005), a case that held the IDEA
does not grant parents the right to
represent their child pro se in federal court and that "parents cannot
pursue their own substantive IDEA
claim pro se." The Winkelmans also
filed a pro se appeal from the district court's merits decision. The
court of appeals ordered dismissal of
that appeal unless the Winkelmans
retained counsel within 30 days.
The Winkelmans sought review of
the Sixth Circuit's decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court granted the Winkelmans' petition for a writ of certiorari. 126
S.Ct. 467 (2006).

CASE ANALYSIS
The IDEA (20 U.S.C. § 1400) provides federal grants to states for
assistance in the education of children with disabilities. The IDEA
seeks to ensure that all disabled
children have available to them a
free appropriate public education.
(The IDEA was amended by the
Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004
effective July 1, 2005.) Under the
IDEA, a state participating in the
grant program must ensure that
each child with a disability receives
a "free appropriate public education" (FAPE), which includes special
education and related services necessary to meet the child's particular
needs.
Under the IDEA, school districts
must create an IEP for each disabled child. If parents believe their
child's IEP is inappropriate, they
may request an impartial due
process hearing. A party dissatisfied
at the conclusion of an impartial
due process hearing may seek further administrative review of the
dispute by the state educational
agency. If still dissatisfied, a party
may pursue a civil action in either
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state or federal court. The IDEA
uses the phrase "[any party
aggrieved by the findings and decisions" to define those entitled to
bring a civil action under the IDEA.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
The Winkelmans argue that parents
of a child with a disability may proceed pro se when they bring a civil
action in a federal court either to
enforce procedural rights under the
IDEA or to seek relief for a substantive violation of the right to a free
appropriate public education. -They
reason that parents are the real parties in interest in such cases.
Parma rejects the Winkelmans'
argument, asserting that the common law prohibits lay parents from
representing their children in court.
Parma contends that the common
law rule furthers several important
policy objectives. First, it says pro
se representation carries with it
risks that are not present when a
party is represented by counsel.
Second, Parma states that attorneys
inject a measure of objectivity often
lacking in an area punctuated by
emotion. According to Parma,
Congress has not abrogated the
common law rule.
Parma stresses that while Congress
provided substantive rights to children with disabilities, it did not
grant their parents any judicially
enforceable rights. Parma declares
that parental safeguards under the
IDEA are collateral, not independent substantive, rights.
According to the Winkelmans, however, Congress viewed parents as
parties aggrieved by adverse administrative decisions and therefore the
real parties in interest to IDEA
suits. They note that parents are the
real parties in interest to the administrative-level proceedings that must
be completed prior to filing a law
suit and are also the real parties in

interest to the administrative
appeals from due process hearings
in those systems that have two tiers
of administrative hearings.
According to the Winkelmans,
because Congress used the same
"parties aggrieved" language in granting the right to administrative appeal
under both 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1)
and 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), the
term should be given a consistent
meaning. The Winkelmans suggest
that Congress had no need to single
out parents from the collective group
of "parties aggrieved" referenced in
§ 1415(i)(2)(A).
Parma argues that the IDEA says
nothing about the right of parents to
proceed in pro se in federal court.
While Congress has expressly
allowed non-attorneys to prosecute
and defend administrative due
process hearings, Parma says it is
difficult to imagine that Congress
meant to instill greater rights in federal proceedings through its silence
on this issue. According to Parma,
the dispute resolution mechanisms
under the IDEA underscore the conclusion that parents are not real
parties in interest. The school district says the purpose of the due
process hearing is to settle disagreements regarding a child's educational program, not to create a fountain
of rights for parents. For that reason, Parma contends the references
to "parents" relied upon by the
Winkelmans in the context of
administrative proceedings effectively treat the parent as the child's
"next friend." Asserting the administrative proceedings are by nature
designed to be a less formal and
more expedient method of dispute
resolution, Parma says that, once
the matter arrives in court, the
IDEA and procedural rules present
a maze of requirements that pro se
litigants will often have trouble
navigating.

The Winkelmans disagree and argue
that the IDEA's provisions, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A), prohibiting challenges to the qualifications of educational agency personnel and conferring jurisdiction to award attorney
fees confirm that parents are real
parties in interest. The Winkelmans
note that the prohibition on challenges to the qualifications of personnel applies "[n]otwithstanding
any other individual right of action
that a parent or student may
maintain under this subchapter."
20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(10)(E),
1412(a)(14)(E). In addition, the
attorney fee provisions of the IDEA
allow the courts "[iln any action or
proceeding brought under this section," to "award reasonable attorneys' fees ... to a prevailing party
who is the parent of a child with a
disability."
According to the Winkelmans, parents are real parties in interest
regardless of whether they are bringing claims alleging violations of
IDEA's substantive right to a FAPE or
violations of IDEA's procedural safeguards. They stress that parents have
their own right to ensure that their
child receives IDEA's statutorily
guaranteed FAPE. The WVinkelmans
assert that neither IDEA's right-toadministrative appeals provision
(20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1)) nor its
right-to-sue provision (20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(i)(2)(A)) precludes "parties
aggrieved" from suing for a substantive violation.
Even if only the child possesses the
substantive statutory right to a
FAPE, the Winkelmans argue, his or
her parents should be able to bring
that claim pro se. They say that lay
(non-lawyer) representation has
been permitted frequently in cases
in which the real party in interest
lacks the ability to represent himor herself and otherwise might go
without adequate representation,
(Continued on Page 258)
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such as cases involving children
from families too poor to afford a
lawyer.
Parma responds that, lacking any
clear language to abrogate the common law rule, the Winkelmans now
seek to carve a novel exception to it
by relying on Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) cases, among others.
According to Parma, IDEA claims
and SSI claims are sufficiently dissimilar to justify different results.
Parma says children's rights are protected both by Congress and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It
points out that the IDEA permits an
award of attorneys' fees in order to
encourage participation of counsel.
Parma also states that Congress permits grants to "parent organizations," which would, among other
things, provide guidance to parents
involved in disputes under the IDEA.
The Winkelmans acknowledge that
in 2004 Congress refused to enact
a provision allowing parental pro se
representation but claim the failed
amendment lacks persuasive
significance.
It is Parma's position that Congress's
recent rejection of amendments that
would have permitted parents to
represent their child pro se is indeed
persuasive. It also argues that the
failed Senate amendment provides a
stark contrast with the language in
the present statute by demonstrating
what would be necessary for
Congress to "speak directly" to the
question presented in this case. In
order to abrogate the common law
or impose obligations of the states
under the Spending Clause, Parma
asserts that Congress must speak
clearly and with precision.
Parma concludes that Congress
must provide clear notice to the
states before subjecting them to
conditions, obligations, or liabilities.
Parma argues that particularly in
Spending Clause cases, the Supreme

Court has exhibited reluctance to
allow implied rights of action.
Parma declares that the
Winkelmans' proposed rule would
inflict conditions, obligations, and
liabilities for which states did not
receive clear notice.
SIGNIFICANCE
Six circuits-the Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eleventh-have held that parents
cannot proceed pro se on behalf of
their child or that the parents
lacked substantive rights. See
Wenger v. CanastotaCent. Sch.
Dist., 146 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1998);
Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. Of Educ.,
161 F.3d 225 (3d. Cir. 1998); Doe v.
Board of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th
Cir. 1998); Cavanaugh v. Cardinal
Local School Dist., 409 F.3d 753
(6th Cir. 2005); Mosely v. Board of
Educ., 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006);
and Devine v. Indian River County
Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576 (11th Cir.
1997). One circuit-the First-has
reached a contrary result. Maroni v.
Pemi-Baker Regional Sch. Dist., 346
F.3d 247 (1st Cir. 2003).
In Arlington Central School District
v. Murphy, 126 S.Ct. 2455 (2006), a
case decided last term, the Supreme
Court relied on the principle that,
when Congress attaches conditions
to a state's acceptance of federal
funds in legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, the
conditions must be set out unambiguously. That is, the legislation
must provide clear notice of the
conditions Congress seeks to place
on the states in order for a state to
knowingly accept and be bound by
them. A divided Supreme Court
ruled in that case that non-attorney
expert's fees for services rendered to
prevailing in an IDEA action are not
"costs" recoverable from the state
under IDEA's fee-shifting provision.
The Supreme Court's decision in
this case should resolve the conflict

among the circuits regarding pro se
representation in IDEA cases. A
decision in favor of the Winkelmans
will make it easier for parents who
are unable or unwilling to obtain
legal counsel to challenge decisions
under the IDEA in court. A decision
affirming the Sixth Circuit could
possibly save school districts money
by discouraging some parents from
bringing lawsuits against them
under the IDEA.
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